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ABSTRACT
We study the evolution of an educational system founded on a hierarchi-
cal diﬀerentiation between vocational and general education, with vocational
playing an inferior role in the society. The dynamics are best summarized
by the ratio of the fraction of the population in vocational to that in general
education, which we interpret as a measure of the degree of stratification of
the society. We show that this ratio first rises and then declines with the
level of development, displaying an inverted U-shape which reflects the com-
plex interaction between economic and political forces, including aggregate
income growth, wealth inequality and political participation.
JEL Classification Numbers: J24, I20, O40, D31.




The new literature on growth has established the crucial role of human capi-
tal and educational attainment in the process of development. However, the
role of the specific structure of the educational system is still largely unex-
plored. In particular, while the distinction between privately and publicly
provided education and that between local and state educational systems
have attracted considerable attention, the available models - and empirical
measures - of educational attainment fail to distinguish between diﬀerent
kinds of curricula.
The aim of this paper is to focus on the distinction between vocational
and general education at the secondary school level, and to study the rela-
tionship between the mix of these two alternative kinds of schooling and the
evolution of societies, both from an economic and a sociopolitical perspec-
tive. Without denying the relevance of technological progress for the issue at
hand, we develop a deeper explanation for the link between education mix
and economic development that stresses the role of distributional conflict
and political change in the shaping of the educational system.
The main idea stems from the observation that, historically, unequal so-
cieties have tended to produce a hierarchical diﬀerentiation of educational
institutions which was founded precisely on the distinction between technical
and general training. Acting as a countervailing force, in the face of the ex-
pansion of educational opportunities that technological progress inevitably
calls for, curricula diﬀerentiation has served the purpose of perpetuating
the pre-existing social order through a process of exclusion of the emerging
middle classes from the more prestigious, academically-oriented institutions.
Accordingly, in an early stage of economic development, vocational curric-
ula have tended to expand, while the subsequent rise of the economic and
political power of the middle class have provoked an enlargement of general
education at a later stage.
In our model, society is initially divided between an aﬄuent “elite” and
a lower class. Every individual is assumed to have the elementary skills
which are taught in primary school. We therefore aim at describing the
phase, in the process of development, during which an economy is already
past initial industrialization and about to jump into its high industrial era.
Accordingly, our focus is on the evolution of secondary education, under the
assumption that the goal of universal basic literacy has already been met.
Secondary education, in its general form, is initially only available to the
elite, and is associated with political power as well as a prestigious social
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status. Preferences include a term which reflects children’s social status.
The initial, static equilibrium is disrupted by the introduction of a new,
modern technology, which requires a combination of general and specific
skills. This justifies the introduction of vocational schools.
Conflict in this society is mediated by the electoral process. The main
issue for educational policies is the size of the general sector. Decisions are
made through majority voting, which is however restricted by a minimum
wealth requirement that is initially met only by the elite. Given the pref-
erence specification, the voting process is such that the median voter will
want his children to enter general high school, while excluding the children of
everyone poorer than himself. We show that in a first stage of development
the size of the vocational sector relative to the general sector increases. At
a later stage, once the pool of individuals with basic education is exhausted,
the vocational sector reaches a ceiling. As lower class wealth levels cross the
voting threshold the political equilibrium generates a general sector that
expands relative to the vocational one. The resulting evolution of the ed-
ucational system is best summarized by the ratio of vocational to general
education (V/G), which we interpret as a measure of the stratification of the
educational system and society. We show that this ratio initially increases
with income and then decreases, reflecting the complex interaction between
economic and political forces in the society.
Note that technological progress alone will not produce the inverse U-
shape relationship. Without voting over the expansion of general education,
together with limits on political participation and an incentive for the elite
to restrict access, V/G would immediately converge to its eﬃcient level.
With all these elements, as the political process opens up, the mix does get
closer to the eﬃcient one but only gradually, and without ever reaching it,
not even asymptotically.
While our model is designed to capture the specific dynamics of the ed-
ucation mix, it also oﬀers consistent and useful predictions for the evolution
of aggregate income, wealth distribution, relative wages and political par-
ticipation. Aggregate income grows throughout the process, but at varying
rates that depend not only on exogenous technological progress, but also on
the endogenous evolution of the educational system. Under realistic para-
meter values, there is a wage premium for general education, which is more
pronounced in the initial phase of the process. In the first phase the faster
rise in the relative wage of general labor increases inequality while eventu-
ally inequality declines, although it never disappears. Political participation
gradually expands, but there is a tendency for the lower class not to be able
3
to aﬀect the political equilibrium immediately.
Our work is related to a growing literature on the political economy
of education, which has its sources in the early contributions on the rela-
tionship between human capital and growth.1 Stiglitz (1974), Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992), Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), Saint-Paul and Verdier
(1993), Boldrin (1993), Gradstein and Justman (1997) and Kaganovich and
Zilcha (1999) focus on public vs. private provision. Benabou (1996) and
Fernandez and Rogerson (1997) distinguish between local and state fund-
ing for education. Kim and Kim (2000), Zeira (1997) and Brunello and
Giannini (2001) consider, as we do, diﬀerent types of curricula, but stress
their technological functions rather than their social role, as reflected by
our specification of preferences. Other papers that consider the role of a
self-interested elite group in shaping educational development include Gross-
man and Kim (1999), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) and Galor and Moav
(2002). The first paper argues that an elite might want to open educa-
tion to poorer agents in order to reduce predation by the poor against the
elite. The second two papers emphasize that short-term economic benefits
for an elite in educational expansion might be oﬀset in the long-run by the
political empowerment of the poor that comes with education. Our model
shares some of this aspect since vocational education increases elite wages
while leading its recipients across the voting threshold. However, our elite
could not choose to stop the process even if it wished to. None of these
models consider the mix of vocational and general education that is central
to our work. Our paper is also connected with a research program which
has focussed on the connection between growth, development and political
institutions in a long-term perspective. Examples from this literature are
Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Bertocchi and Spagat (2001). Finally,
another important source of inspiration for the present paper is the stream
of recent work on the connection between the sociological analysis of fac-
tors such as social status and norms and their economic implications (Cole,
Mailath and Postlewaite (1992), Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss (1996) and
Corneo and Jeanne (1999)).
In contrast to the economics literature, the sociology literature has a
long tradition of studying curriculum diﬀerentiation in secondary education.
There are two main theories aimed at explaining the evolution of modern
educational systems. The “functionalist” perspective emphasizes the role of
technology in driving curriculum diﬀerentiation: in this view, the initial rise
1See Lucas (1988) and Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
4
of vocational education would reflect nothing more than rising labor market
demand for related skills and viceversa in a subsequent phase. However,
a large empirical literature, surveyed in Collins (1971), fails to establish
a correspondence between the dynamics in the demand for specific skills
(as reflected by a number of skill measures) and the supply of such skills
(as reflected in the educational attainment of the population). This casts
serious doubt on any explanation for the evolution of educational systems
that relies primarily on the technological requirements of jobs. In contrast,
the “conflict” perspective sees curriculum diﬀerentiation more in terms of
an elite group preserving its position by channeling a substantial portion
of educational expansion into second-tier varieties that will not allow their
recipients entry into elite circles. In this view curricula diﬀerentiation reflects
an attempt by the elite to protect its exclusiveness (Weber (1921), Neelsen
(1975)). Our approach integrates aspects of both the functionalist and the
conflict approach while being closer in spirit to the latter than the former.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present
empirical and historical evidence in support of our modelling assumptions.
In section 3 we present the model. In section 4 we derive our results. Section
5 draws some conclusions and derives policy implications of our results.
2 Empirical and historical evidence
For the sake of clarity we should be precise here about definitions. By “voca-
tional” education, we mean a course of secondary schooling directly related
to a specific occupation, where a large part of the curriculum is devoted to
learning practical skills to be used immediately upon graduation. Standard
usage refers to vocational education also as “technical”, “practical”, “ap-
plied”, sometimes “modern” education. “General” education, on the other
hand, is defined by a curriculum that has no immediate connection with
any occupational application, but prepares the student in basic knowledge
that can be used to learn many diﬀerent occupations. “Academic”, “classi-
cal”, or “liberal” studies therefore also fit the definition of general education
which includes such elite institutions as the German Gymnasium, the French
Lycee and the English Public Schools. At the primary level, all education
tends to be general in nature, while for higher education “specialized” cur-
ricula necessarily prevail. Indeed, general education has traditionally been
a prerequisite to gain access to higher education. Therefore, we focus our
investigation on the secondary level of education, for which the distinction
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we stress is a meaningful one. Note that we do not deny that recipients of
vocational education benefit from their training. We merely point out that
historically general secondary education has been a much better avenue into
elite circles than has vocational education.
Our analysis is motivated by the stylized fact that for a wide variety of
countries the ratio of the fraction of the population in vocational secondary
education to that in general secondary education (V/G ) is low at an early
stage of development, high at a medium stage and low again at a high stage.
Available evidence suggests that this relationship tends to hold in both time
series and cross section.
Regarding time series behavior, Bertocchi and Spagat (1997) show that
for Italy V/G goes from 1.05 in 1861 to a peak of 3.06 in 1921 and back
down to 0.71 in 1990 (see Figure 1). Flora (1983) studies several European
countries, and finds that whenever complete time series are available for
a prolonged time span, once again there is evidence of an initial rise and
a subsequent decline of V/G (as in Austria, 1881-1975, and Switzerland,
1888-1936); consistently, when data are instead available only for an ear-
lier period, V/G grows steadily, as in Sweden, 1886-1910; while it declines
monotonically over the post-war period in France and England. Finally, ac-
cording to Mueller (1977), the V/G ratio in Prussia starts in 1854 at 0.39,
with a steady increase to 2.4 in 1936.
Cross-section evidence is provided by Bennett (1967) for a data set in-
cluding 70 countries. He found an inverse-U relationship with the rich and
poor countries tending to have low secondary school V/G ratios and middle
income countries having high ratios.
In this paper we assemble a much more comprehensive UNESCO data
set (see Appendix I) covering a panel of 149 countries for 1950-1991 and
confirmed evidence for an inverted U-shape relationship between secondary












with t values of 10.1 and -9.4 for the first and the second coeﬃcient, respec-
tively. This equation suggests that V/G is maximized at a per capita GDP
level of $7,310. Figure 2 shows the average value of V/G for all the coun-
tries in each of 19 income classes (where each class is $1,000 wide, i.e., class
1 includes observations ranging from $0 to $1,000, while class 19 includes
observations ranging from $18,001 to $19,000).
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Mueller, Ringer, and Simon (1977) provide a socio-historical and compar-
ative account of that decisive period, in the history of European education,
that goes from 1870 to WWI. Through a country by country investigation,
these authors show that in England, France and Germany, during the late
19th century, educational institutions were transformed into a system which
has been since modified, but never replaced. Before this time, the dominant
form of secondary education was centered upon the classical languages and
literature. The transformation that intervened was centered around the in-
troduction of less prestigious institutions which were supposed to provide
so-called modern, or technical, training. One motive that determined this
transformation was to bring schools into closer interaction with the occu-
pational system of the high industrial era. However, it is clear that specific
social roles and ranks were associated with diﬀerent institutions, with tech-
nical curricula being ranked very low. Therefore, while it is true that access
to secondary education was widely enlarged, this did not imply a real democ-
ratization of educational opportunities, because this process was matched
by a growing complexity of educational institutions. Segmentation produced
parallel, non-communicating tracks, with marked diﬀerences both in their
curricula and the social origin of the students enrolled. The system that
emerged was meant to perpetuate the hierarchical structure of these soci-
eties and, at least as the structure of the educational system is concerned,
did achieve this goal at least until WWI. The expansion of enrollments in
secondary school was therefore accompanied by a process of exclusion. The
data reported indeed show that during this period we observe a quantita-
tive stability in the traditional education sector, along with an expansion
in the new, and less accredited, schools. This pattern was followed by all
European countries. Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) report additional support-
ing evidence for an investigation covering thirteen countries. For a larger
set of countries, in 1967 the OECD (1967) still finds evidence of a marked
institutional diﬀerentiation.
As a by-product of colonization, the European model was exported to a
large portion of the less developed world. The metropolitan countries in fact
generalized to their colonies the principles underlying the organization and
articulation of the metropolitan educational institutions, interfering with the
local process of elite formation. Moreover, the colonial educational policies
are believed to have significantly aﬀected human capital formation in these
countries even after independence (Foster (1966), Clignet (1968)).
Trow (1967) describes the evolution of the education system in the
United States, which requires a separate discussion, despite the many sim-
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ilarities with Europe. Before 1870, the American secondary school system
oﬀered a mass, largely terminal secondary school system was developed, with
the purpose of providing increasingly vocational education to the emerging
middle class. In a later phase, after WWII, the system underwent a sec-
ond transformation, moving it in the direction of a mass preparatory, rather
than a terminal, system (see also Goldin (1994)). However, a very impor-
tant diﬀerence with the European dual system is the early introduction in
the US of the comprehensive school. This was done under the influence of
thinkers such as John Dewey (1916), with the declared goal of strengthening
more general aspects of high school curricula and at the same time avoiding
premature career choices and facilitating greater social cohesion. However,
the OECD (1967) report suggests that the objectives of the comprehensive
school have remained unfulfilled, having not been able to satisfy the claim
for equality by the lower classes. Diﬀerentiated, vocational curricula do in
fact still appear in the US, in a lagged fashion, at the college level, while
at the same time the diﬀusion of tracking within the comprehensive school
system can be viewed as fulfilling the same stratifying role of European
vocational schools.
To conclude, on the basis of a broad evidence, the first stage described in
our model, which predicts an expansion of the ratio between vocational and
general education, for the developed countries can be dated as the period
that goes from the 1870s up until WWI, with a peak being reached during
the interwar period. A phase of relative stability of the ratio is then fol-
lowed by a final decline after WWII. Therefore, our model does capture the
crucial features of the evolution of modern educational systems in advanced
countries, starting from the end of last century. And it can also support the
conclusions of cross-section investigations based on countries which display
diﬀerent levels of developments.
The predictions of our model on the evolution of wealth distribution are
also consistent with the historical evidence. Among economic historians (see,
for example, Lindert and Williamson (1985)) there is general agreement that
during the third quarter of the last century inequality started to decline.
For the developed countries, the downswing phase of the Kuznets curve
(see Kuznets (1955)) therefore coincides historically with the period we are
referring to.
Historical research also supports our conclusions regarding political par-
ticipation. Following an early stage during which participation in the polit-
ical process is restricted to an elite, it progressively expands in a subsequent
phase (Bendix (1978), Flora (1983)). In Britain, for example, the franchise
8
was extended first in 1832, and then again in 1867 and 1884, while the school
reform process leading to the modern system started with the Education Act
in 1870 (followed by additional reforms in 1891, 1893, 1899, and by the 1902
Balfour Act, which introduced the grammar school as the foundation of the
British secondary school). Similarly, in all other European countries school
reforms and enrollment expansion - along the lines previously described -
started only after democratization
3 The model
Technology and wages Time is counted oﬀ in discrete intervals t =
1, 2, ... . At time 1 the economy adopts a new, modern technology given by
Qt = AtGαt V 1−αt (3.1)
where Qt is output, Gt is the input of labor which received a general ed-
ucation and Vt is the input of vocational labor at time t respectively. We
assume, except in section 4.3.4, that the parameter α ≥ 12 , which implies
that the income share of general labor is greater than the income share of
vocational labor. This assumption reflects the historical evidence which is
available for late 19th-century Europe, where a large share of income and
wealth was held by a small privileged group. 2 This assumption also implies
that the marginal product of general labor will exceed that of vocational la-
bor unless the number of general workers exceeds that of vocational workers,
something that, it turns out, cannot occur in this model.
The sequence {At}∞t=1 describes an exogenous process of technological
progress, that evolves according to
At = γAt−1 (3.2)
with γ > 1. The idea is that, before time 1, the technology was diﬀerent and
in particular did not require vocational labor. Therefore, it is technological
progress that triggers the reform of the educational system.
2In the UK the income share of the top 10% of the population was 53.4% in 1867,
and remained above 50% well through the pre-WWI period. Wealth, which is proxied
in our model by the bequests, was even more concentrated, with 76.7% being held by
the top 10%, and 65.7% by the top 5% in 1875. A similar pattern was followed by the
other European countries. See Flora, Kraus and Pfenning (1987), Lindert (1986) and
Williamson (1991).
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Production continues in a constant-returns-to-scale traditional sector
that uses the quantity of minimally educated labor, Ut, to produce out-
put Ut. So total output includes both the modern sector and the traditional
sector and is given by Qt + Ut.
All three types of labor are paid their marginal product. Therefore,
at each t, simple labor receives a wage of 1, vocational labor gets wVt =
(1− α)AtGαt V −αt and general labor gets wGt = αAtGα−1t V 1−αt .
Social structure and wealth distribution There is a stationary pop-
ulation of overlapping generations of individuals who live for two periods.3
Each individual has one parent and one child. In each generation there
is a continuum of individuals of size 1, with the generic agent denoted by
i ∈ [0, 1].
Adult individual i at time t has either basic education only, or secondary
education as well. Secondary education comes in two kinds: vocational and
general. Accordingly, we divide the total population into three segments
at each point in time: individuals i ∈ [0, Ut] have only basic education,
individuals i ∈ (Ut, Vt] have vocational education and individuals i ∈ (Vt, 1]
have general education.4 The last group, of size Gt = 1 − Vt, which we
refer to as the “elite”, initially holds a monopoly over general education.
We assume that at time 1 the elite is less than half the population. The
“non-elite”, of size Ut+Vt = 1−Gt includes both the vocationally educated
and those with only basic education.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all individuals who belong to
the elite start with an identical level of initial wealth, bG1, that exceeds all
non-elite wealth levels. The non-elite have various levels of initial wealth, bi1.
Without loss of generality we order the individuals so that bit ≥ bjt iff i ≥
j. Let Ft (·) denote the distribution function over wealth at time t. We
assume that F1 (·)0 s only positive mass point is at bG1.
The educational system Each recipient of vocational education must
pay a “tuition” cV in order to train in the first period of his life. 5 Since such
3On the specific link between population growth and education, see Dahan and Tsiddon
(1998).
4Later we will show that family dynasties can only move up, from basic education to
vocational education and from vocational education to general education so there will be
no ambiguity over this classification.
5The main results of the model are robust to an alternative specification where all
schools are financed by the elite (see Bertocchi and Spagat (1998)).
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an individual could have worked and received a wage of 1 in both periods
of his life, the full opportunity cost of education is 2 + cV . Therefore, it is
individually rational to choose vocational education over unskilled work in
period t iﬀ wVt ≥ 2 + cV .
Similarly, recipients of general education pay tuition cG ≤ cV . A strict
inequality would capture the idea that vocational education requires extra
equipment expenditures not incurred for general education. While a strict
inequality is not necessary for our analysis, the empirical literature docu-
ments that indeed all practically-oriented training is associated with higher
costs. 6 Of course, individuals will choose general education over vocational
education iﬀ wGt − cG ≥ wVt − cV .
We will use the notation yit to denote individual i0s “total income”, after
tuition and inclusive of inheritance, at time t as yit = bit + 2 for i ∈ Ut ,
yit = bit + wVt − cV for i ∈ Vt and yit = bit +wGt − cG for i ∈ Gt.
Individual lives In the first period of life, individuals either take a job
after acquiring basic education, or they go to secondary school. At the end
of the period, they receive a bequest from their parent, and in the next
period they collect a wage, consume, leave a bequest to their children, and
vote over educational issues to be specified below.
Preferences Individuals care not only about the income they leave to
their children, 7 but also about their children’s social status. In this society,
status is derived from access to general education, which is perceived as more
prestigious than vocational education. Formally, preferences over activities
at time t are given by
uit = (1− δ) log cit + δ log bit+1 + sit+1 (3.3)
where 0 < δ < 1 is a preference parameter, cit is consumption, bit+1 is the
bequest to the child, and the variable sit+1 captures the notion of social
status with sit+1 = 1Gt+1 if the child is admitted to the elite and sit+1 = 0
if the child is excluded from it. Notice that, in the event the child does
belong to Gt+1, the corresponding utility is decreasing in the size of Gt+1.8
6See Psacharopoulos (1994).
7The “warm glow” type of preferences is chosen to simplify the analysis. Roberts (1999)
is an interesting attempt to generalize such analysis to the case of dynastic preferences.
8Nothing depends on the linear specification of the status term in (3.3). Any formula-
tion such that the utility of the elite is increasing in the exclusiveness of general education
is suﬃcient for our purposes.
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This is consistent with general education being the exclusive and prestigious
privilege of a restricted segment of the population.
Since social status, through social arrangements, has certainly played a
crucial, stable and persistent role in the evolution of modern educational
systems, we believe that it is reasonable to postulate preferences that di-
rectly include it as an argument. On the other hand, we stress that we
have introduced it only to simplify the voting procedure described below.
In particular, it is crucial for our analysis that agents with access to elite
education wish to exclude others from this privilege. We can work with any
mechanism that accomplishes this goal.
Political participation and the general education sector At time t,
in addition to their consumption and bequest decisions, old-age individuals
also vote on the size of the general education sector in the next period,
Gt+1. They care about this because of the presence of social status in their
utility functions. There is an exogenous minimum wealth requirement, eb,
for participation in the voting process.9 Consistent with the social function
of the elite in this model, we assume that, once a dynasty makes into the
elite, he can never be kicked out, i.e., Gt+1 ≥ Gt.10 The people for whom
bit ≥ eb vote on the expansion of general education, i.e., the amount by which
Gt+1 exceeds Gt. Note that the qualitative predictions of the model would
not be aﬀected by the introduction of an endogenous level of eb which could,
for instance, be inversely related to the level of income, or else replaced by
a minimum schooling requirement.11 To organize the exposition we assume
that, initially, the elite’s income is above eb, while the income of all the
non-elite is below eb.
Elite expansion between times t and t+ 1 is decided by majority voting
9Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) and Gradstein and Justman (1999) also introduce a
franchise requirement. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) study the link between the pro-
gressive extension of the franchise, growth and inequality.
10One way to think of this assumption is that the elite has good cohesion and, therefore,
takes care of its own member.
11Formal wealth and/or education requirements were widespread up until the beginning
of the 20th century, both in the Old and in the New World (see Engerman and Sokoloﬀ
(2001)). In addition, as argued by Almond and Verba (1963) and Brady, Verba and
Schlozman (1995), participation in the political system can be de facto denied to the
poorest segments of the population even within fully democratic political systems. Husted
and Kenny (1997) discuss several devices, such as poll taxes and literacy tests, that have
been employed to restrict the poor from voting. Our simple modelling assumption is
meant to capture also this kind of situations.
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amongst the eligible old generation at time t with the median voter deter-
mining the result. Note that at the time of the vote Gt is already determined
so that the vote is really over Gt+1. Once Gt+1 is selected children are en-
rolled into elite education in order of their parents’ wealth, i.e., the richest





with wealth not less than bGt will get their children into general schools and,
hence, the elite. Given this mechanism, each voter, i, has a most preferred
expansion level Git+1 − Gt ∈ [0, 1−Gt] and the actual expansion will be
median {Git+1}.12
It should be stressed that restricted majority voting is just a device to
capture the idea that the elite begins with all the power but gradually loses
a lot of it as the economy develops. All we need is that the mechanism
determining entry into general education gives increasing power to people
lower down the economic ladder as these people get richer.
Finally, the mechanism of admitting individuals into the elite in order
of their wealth is rather arbitrary, although not entirely unrealistic. But this
is, again, only a simplifying assumption. We could use other mechanisms,
such as ability, to determine entry and our results will be essentially the
same.
Utility maximization When individuals make their utility maximization
decisions the size of the general education sector for their generation has
already been determined through voting of the previous generation. At this
point, by previous assumption, access to higher education is dictated by
parental wealth. Of course, other selection mechanisms, such as selection
by test scores, are possible. In practice, wealthy individuals tend to have
better entry chances to good schools under any selection mechanism so this
assumption relatively innocuous.
For simplicity, we assume the interest rate to be zero. Each non-elite
individual, i, below the voting threshold chooses cit, bit+1and whether or
not to take a vocational education to maximize utility (3.3) subject to
(i) cit + bit+1 ≤ yit.
(ii) wVt given.
Note that the educational choice is relevant for determining yit.
Each non-elite individual , i, above the voting threshold chooses cit, bit+1,
the size of the general education sector, Git+1, and whether or not to take
12The political issue is well-defined, since it is unidimensional and implies single-peaked
preferences. If the median is not unique we can select the infimum of the set of media.
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a vocational education to maximize utility (3.3) subject to the constraints
(i) cit + bit+1 ≤ yit
(ii) Gt+1 = median {Git+1, {Gjt+1 : j 6= i}}
(iii) Git+1 ≥ Gt is not weakly dominated
(iv) wVt , Gjt+1∀j 6= i given.
The third constraint is standard in the voting literature to prevent arbitrary
voting when there are a large number of voters and no individual can directly
aﬀect the outcome through his vote. It is equivalent to a requirement that
no voter would be dissatisfied with his vote if he were suddenly made a
dictator. Its eﬀect is to ensure sincere voting.
Each elite individual , i, chooses cit, bit+1, Git+1 and whether take a
general, vocational or no education to maximize utility (3.3) subject to the
constraints
(i) cit + bit+1 ≤ yit
(ii) Gt+1 = median {Git+1, {Gjt+1 : j 6= i}}
(iii) Git+1 ≥ Gt is not weakly dominated
(iv) wVt , wGt , Gjt+1∀j 6= i given.
Note that elite membership allows but does not compel an individual to take
a general education.
The solutions to these maximization problems are quite simple. First,
educational decisions are chosen to maximize income. To describe these
decisions we introduce the notation eit = U, V, or G to denote, respectively,
a decision to remain unskilled, take vocational education or take general
education for individual i at time t. Second, non-voting individuals take
their total income, yit, consume a fraction (1− δ) and bequeath a fraction
δ to their oﬀspring. Third, voters also consume (1 − δ) yit and bequeath
δyit. Finally, voting is also simple. All individuals already in the elite sector
have a preferred expansion of zero, whereas every other individuals wants
the elite sector to expand exactly up to the point that includes them. This
set-up will deliver the implication that the elite sector can never expand
beyond 12 .
Political equilibrium
Definition. A political equilibrium starting from initial conditions A1, bi1 for
i ∈ [0, 1] and G1 consists of a sequence
n
cit, bit+1, eit, Git+1, Ut, Vt, Gt, wVt , wGt
o∞
t=1
such that the following hold: (i) {cit, bit+1, eit, Git+1} are determined for all
i ∈ [0, 1] and t by maximizing utility subject to the appropriate constraints;
(ii) for all t the triple {Ut, Vt, Gt} giving aggregate numbers in each type of
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education is consistent with individual decisions; (iii) wVt and wGt are market
determined for all t = 1, 2, ...; (iv) Gt for t = 2, 3, ... is a voting equilibrium.
4 Analysis of the model
4.1 The size of the vocational education sector
The new technology that is introduced at time 1 creates a demand for both
general and specific skills. For expositional convenience we will distinguish
between two stages of economic development. In Stage 1 is defined by the
property that there are still people working in the traditional sector while
Stage 2 is defined by the disappearance of the traditional sector. So in
Stage 1 only some of the non-elite choose vocational education and there is
income equalization between the vocational and unskilled workers. In Stage
2 the modern technology is suﬃciently powerful that nobody would choose
unskilled work and secondary education is universal, either in the vocational
or general form. In the following discussion, we analyze the determination
of the size of the vocational education sector and the corresponding wages
stage by stage. As it will become apparent, in each stage the evolution of
Vt will be governed by diﬀerent dynamics, which will in turn determine all
other endogenous variables and the identity of the median voter. It should
also be clear that the time at which the economy will switch from Stage 1
to Stage 2 is endogenously determined within the model.
Stage 1 All agents in the model can choose to remain unskilled or to
train for vocational labor (the elite has the additional choice of general
labor). Therefore, until the time τ at which Uτ = 0, there must be income
equalization across the two types of labor, i.e., it must be the case that
wVt − cV = 2.13 This implies that the Vt satisfies
Vt = (
(1− α)At
2 + cV )
1
αGt (4.1)
Equation (4.1) has reasonable properties. By complementarity, Vt in-
creases with Gt. Moreover, Vt is increasing in At, the level of technology.
13This equality is a simplification device. There are various assumptions we could
make that would drive a wedge between the two wages but they would add nothing but
complication to the analysis. Note also that we have assumed that individuals are admitted
into vocational schools in order of their wealth, with the richest getting in first. Nothing
that follows depends on this assumption.
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Finally, the cost of vocational education, cV , is negatively related to Vt. If






2 + cV )
1−α
α (4.2)
which shows that only the wage rate for general labor follows the evolution
of technological progress, while the vocational wage rate, 2+cV , at this stage
does not benefit from it. This is because improvements in technology lead
to increases in the quantity of vocational workers, eliminating the pressure











which implies that there is a positive wage premium for general education
when





meaning that technology has to be suﬃciently advanced while costs have to
be relatively moderate. It can be shown that α ≥ 12 implies that α−α (1− α)
α−1 ≤
2. So At ≥ 4 + 2cV is a suﬃcient, although far from a necessary, condition
for elite wages to always exceed vocational wages throughout Stage 1. Of
course, if this is the case then general labor will be preferred by the elite
to vocational labor even after tuition since we have assumed that cV ≥ cG.
Thus, the provisional assumption that all elite individuals choose general
education would be validated.
We summarize the behavior in Stage 1 with the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In Stage 1: a) Vt and VtGt are increasing; b) vocational incomes
equal incomes for basic education after tuition payments are accounted for.
Stage 2 From time τ on, i.e., after the pool of individuals with only basic
education has been exhausted and Ut = 0. Again making the provisional
assumption that all elite member choose general education, the size of the
vocational sector of the educational system will be determined residually as
Vt = 1−Gt. The size of the vocational sector cannot increase further during
this stage and may decrease as people move up into the general sector.
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Substituting into (3.1) and calculating marginal products, we can find
the corresponding wage rates, which are given by








Both increase with technological progress and depend on the ratio VtGt , pos-







This will never be less than 1, because α ≥ 12 and the voting equilibrium
always gives Gt ≤ 12 . Including tuition payments only increases the general
education premium. Therefore, elite individuals would indeed choose general
education.
Again we summarize with a proposition.
Proposition 2. In Stage 2: a) Vt and
Vt
Gt are not increasing and may be
decreasing in t; b) general incomes are greater than vocational incomes.
4.2 Note on the Role of Social Status
As mentioned above, we have included social status in the utility function
merely as an analytical convenience so that voters wish to restrict access
to general education once their own children are admitted. An alternative
would be to have individuals’ preferences respond positively to the income
of their children. This would deliver identical results in Stage 2 where elite
wages are decreasing in Gt. However, in Stage 1 this is not the case, because
more general workers draw more vocational workers, preserving the wages
of the former. In practice, such a mechanism would probably not work
perfectly smoothly so that parents would retain a motive for keeping their
children’s skills scarce. Such an imperfection could do the same work in our
model as social status does in Stage 1. However, we choose social status
because it strikes us as a simple and persuasive reduced form.14
14See Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) and Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss (1996)
for papers primarily interested in the nature of status.
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4.3 Dynamics
We are now ready to examine in detail the dynamic implications of the
introduction of the vocational education sector. We get interesting dynamics
for the size of the vocational and the general education sectors, for the level
of income and its growth rate, for the degree of inequality and for the rate
of political participation. We will study the evolutions of all these variables
by proceeding, once again, stage by stage. The next subsection, 4.3.1, will
be devoted to the first stage, while 4.3.2 will explore Stage 2.
4.3.1 The expansion of the vocational education sector
First of all, notice that the evolution of voting outcomes is captured by the
identity of the median voter. Since we have assumed that the non-elite are
all below the voting threshold in period 1, the size of the general education
sector will be the same in period 2 as it is in period 1. After period 2
it is possible for lower class incomes to rise above the voting threshold.
If enough of them do to change the class of the median voter, then the
general education sector will expand. The identity of the median voter will
not change throughout Stage 1 if, for example, all elite dynasties begin
with wealth levels far below the voting threshold and technology remain
suﬃciently weak throughout the stage so that no other dynasty is able to
cross the threshold. On the other hand, under opposite circumstances, it can
happen that everyone quickly crosses the threshold so that the median voter
becomes the median member of the economy’s whole wealth distribution.
Since this can only happen if the entire population is skilled it would imply
an immediate transition to Stage 2.
If the general sector does not expand during Stage 1 then, by equation




which predicts that there will be a continuous expansion of Vt at the rate of
γ 1α − 1, driven by technological progress. If, on the other hand, the voting
equilibrium does change during Stage 1, forcing expansion of the general
sector, then the vocational sector will grow faster than γ 1α − 1. Social and
technological factors therefore contribute to the shaping of the educational




= γ 1α VtGt
(4.9)
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which holds regardless of whether or not the voting equilibrium is changing
during Stage 1. Finally, it is clear that the secondary school enrollment
ratio, which is given by Vt +Gt, will also be increasing during this stage.
The growth implications for this phase are as follows. Aggregate income
dynamics can be tracked by computing the rate of growth for the output of
the modern sector of the economy, i.e., the one that employs vocational and
general labor. Until the voting equilibrium changes we have, using (3.1),
(3.2) and (4.9) that the rate of growth of the modern sector is given by
gM ≡ Qt+1Qt −1 = γ
2−1. This growth rate is positive and greater than γ−1,
the rate that would be sustainable purely due to technological progress.
Note that this growth rate does not depend on t. If the voting equilibrium
does change during Stage 1 then gM > γ2 − 1.
Traditional sector growth is given by gTt ≡
Ut+1








Ut when the voting equilibrium is not changing and even
more negative when it is changing. Despite the shrinkage of the traditional
sector, total output must be increasing because wages are higher in the
modern sector than in the traditional sector and every individual is paid
his marginal product. Since income grows monotonically with time, it is
therefore legitimate to establish a positive relationship between the ratio
Vt
Gt and the level of income Qt + Ut. In fact, when productivity in the
modern sector is high then the traditional sector will be very small relative
to the modern sector and the growth rate for the whole economy will be
approximately equal to the growth rate of the modern sector. Therefore, as
long as the voting equilibrium is not changing at this stage, the two variables
grow at approximately the same speed. We summarize with the following.
Proposition 3. In Stage 1: a) VtGt grows at the rate of γ
1
α − 1; b) when the
elite is not expanding Qt also grows at the rate γ
1
α − 1, while it grows faster
otherwise; c) the identity of the median voter can either remain unchanged
throughout the stage or it can rise to anything less than 12 .
Let us analyze now the evolution of income distribution in the society.
Utility maximization leads to the bequest function
bit+1 = δyit (4.10)
for i ∈ V,G,U . For suﬃciently high wages the sequence of bequests for a dy-
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nasty will be increasing. This is a very reasonable condition for the modern
sector because if this condition were not satisfied then the new technology
would be inferior to the previous one, which had endowed the initial gener-
ations with bequests bi1. We will therefore proceed under the assumption
that this condition is indeed satisfied for workers in the modern sector. Be-
fore completing the analysis of the evolution of wealth distribution we will
assume that (3.5) holds, i.e., that throughout Stage 1 after-tuition elite in-
come exceeds after-tuition vocational income even when all elite members
choose general education.












for the elite, and by
bit+1 = δ(bit + 2) (4.12)
for vocational workers. Notice again that the income of the elite increases
with technological progress while the income of individuals with vocational
education does not. Since elite wages and wealth are already larger than
their vocational counterparts in period 1, this lopsided wage growth exacer-
bates inequality.
4.3.2 The contraction of the vocational education sector
Stage 2 is reached at the time τ that all individuals are enrolled in secondary
school, i.e., it is defined by the condition Uτ = 0 which implies that the
secondary school enrollment ratio is 1. Equations (3.2) and (4.1) together
imply that Stage 2 must eventually be reached. From that point on Vt will
be determined as a corner solution rather than through (4.1).
Our discussion of Stage 1 indicated that at the beginning of Stage 2 it is
possible that every dynasty will have already crossed the voting threshold.
It is also possible that the voting population remains identical with the elite.
Of course, anything in between can also happen depending on technology
and the initial wealth distribution. During Stage 2 skilled wages rise without
bound and the voting threshold, eb, remains fixed. Moreover, by definition, in
Stage 2, everyone is skilled. So during this stage everybody must eventually
cross the voting threshold if they have not already. Let us consider both
cases in detail.
20
Define ζ to be the first period reflecting a change in the voting equilib-
rium, i.e., ζ is the smallest number such that Gζ > G1. Note that this must
happen for some finite ζ because, by (3.2) and (4.6), vocational wages grow
without bound in Stage 2 and so eventually everyone must get the franchise
in this stage if they did not already get it in Stage 1. Suppose for the mo-
ment that ζ > τ and consider the dynamics during this substage. From τ
to ζ both Gt and Vt are constant, and so is their ratio. The growth rate of
output in the modern sector, which is the only one left, equals γ − 1 so it is
slower than in Stage 1.
The evolution of bequests is given by the equations
bit+1 = δ(bit + αAt(
Vt
Gt
)1−α − cG) (4.13)
for elite individuals and
bit+1 = δ(bit + (1− α)At(
Gt
Vt
)α − cV ) (4.14)
for non-elite individuals, with the elite continuing to bequeath more than
the non-elite throughout Stage 2.
Now consider together the case where ζ ≤ τ and the case where ζ > τ
and t ≥ ζ. The median voter now is not a member of the original elite, and
is able to vote his child into the general education sector, thus expanding
the size of Gt. The sequence of events is as follows: since Gt can only
expand at the expense of Vt, the expansion of Gt comes with a reduction
in Vt. The ratio VtGt therefore falls, at a speed that depends on the initial
wealth distribution, and will be faster the smaller the dispersion in the
initial wealth levels of the lower class bi1. Moreover, as Gt grows, wVt rises,
pushing towards income equalization and accelerating expansion of political
participation. The identity of the median voter will change accordingly,
and more and more people will be able to vote their children into general
education.
We can now derive the growth implications for this stage of the economy.







)1−α − 1 (4.15)
which depends on the dynamics of VtGt and will be greater than 0 as long as
Gt < α. This condition will always by satisfied because no more than half
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the population can ever be voted into general education.15
In the long run, the economy and society reach a steady state with full
political participation. At that time the ratio VtGt stabilizes at 1 and aggregate
output growth equals γ − 1. Individual incomes tend toward equalization.
However, since the outcome of the voting process implies that Gt will never
rise above 12 , in the long run the elite will earn more than the non-elite as
long as α > 12 . On the other hand, the children of the original elite will
progressively lose their monopoly over general education, the voting process
and much of the economic privilege attached to this social status. Another
implication is that the income share of the enlarged pool of individuals with
general education will remain greater than 12 .
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4. In Stage 2: a) Output grows; b) VtGt may remain constant
initially; c) eventually VtGt will decrease monotonically to 1; d) the voting
population converges to the entire population.
Combining Propositions 3 and 4 leads to the main result of the paper,
which is that the relationship between VtGt and income follows an inverse
U-shape.
Proposition 5. In Stage 1 VtGt increases with the level of income; in Stage 2
Vt
Gt initially decreases with the level of income, and then becomes a constant.
4.3.3 Summary
For expositional clarity, we will now summarize the evolution of each variable
of interest, stage by stage. For simplicity consider the case in which ζ > τ .
Figure 3 describes the evolution of the educational system. In Stage 1 the
vocational sector grows at the rate γ 1α − 1. In Stage 2, it is constant from
time τ to time ζ, and then it decreases until some time ξ after which it
equals 12 . The general sector is constant through Stage 1 and continues so
until time ζ of Stage 2. After that it increases until ξ and stabilizes at 12 .
The ratio VtGt rises from 1 to τ , is constant between τ and ζ and decreases
between ζ and ξ at which point it stabilizes at 1. The secondary school





enrollment ratio grows steadily over time and reaches 100% by Stage 2.
Figure 4 describes the evolution of aggregate income, which always rises in
this model, but at varying rates, reflecting endogenously the evolution of
the educational system. Initially, as the economy exploits more and more
intensively the new technology by employing vocational labor, the rate is
highest at γ 1α − 1. By Stage 2, the traditional sector has disappeared and
growth is slower because the opportunities to shift labor into the modern
sector have disappeared: the growth rate is γ−1 from τ to ζ and from ξ on,
and higher between ζ and ξ. Inequality increases in Stage 1, since elite wages
increase while non-elite wages remain constant. By the time ζ at which VtGt
starts to decline, vocational wages pick up thanks to the relative scarcity
of vocational labor, but only under the condition α = 12 will they reach
the level of general wages. When this condition is not satisfied, inequality
will persist in the long run. Political participation tends to increases with
income, but enfranchisement of the non-elite does not immediately aﬀect
the voting outcome, because initially the median voter is still a member of
the original elite. At time ζ the median voter does not come from the elite
and is able to vote his child into general education. Political participation
is full in the long run
4.3.4 The case of α < 12
While the above analysis has been conducted under the assumption of a
higher income share for the generally educated, it is instructive to analyze
also the opposite case. For α < 12 the system will tend toward wage equal-
ization for general and vocational labor in the long run. Similar dynamics
operate as in the α ≥ 12 case, but Gt tends toward α rather than
1
2 . When
Gt = α and Vt = 1 − α there is wage equalization and when Gt > α and
Vt < 1−α vocational wages exceed general wages. Elite members are allowed
to choose vocational education so incomes in the vocational sector can never
exceed incomes in the general sector, but since vocational education costs
more than general education there can be a small vocational wage premium.
However, since wages grow without bound and education costs are fixed in
the model, the significance of cost diﬀerentials disappears in the long run
and wages converge while Gt converges to α and Vt converges to 1− α.
5 Conclusion
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To conclude, we would like to indicate a few possible implications of our
model for educational policies in developing countries. Policy-oriented re-
search on the economics of education has developed along two lines. The
first is a micro-oriented approach, which has focused primarily on the com-
pilation of rate-of-returns estimates to investment in education. These stud-
ies, as surveyed in Psacharopoulos (1994), have reached the conclusion that
the academic secondary school curriculum provides higher returns than the
technical/vocational track Our model is consistent with such an empirical
result, and with the implied policy prescription .16
The second stream of literature, closer to our approach, is directly linked
to growth theory and its macroeconomic implications. In this work the role
of vocational vs. general education for development has been addressed only
very superficially. The conventional wisdom, in accordance with a function-
alist view, used to be that vocational education should have higher priority
in developing economies than in developed countries, and this conclusion
permeated the orientation of international organizations and less-developed
countries’ governments in the early post-war period. 17 However, we have
demonstrated how sociopolitical factors play a crucial role in the shaping
of educational systems, and that the expansion of the vocational sector in
an early development stage may actually be the goal of a policy of exclu-
sion perpetrated by an elite group. Local policymakers who negotiate with
international organizations are invariably members of the same elite group.
The main lesson from this paper is that international policymakers involved
in human capital development planning must develop a keener awareness of
the sociopolitical considerations that interfere with strictly economic ones
and act accordingly.
16Bertocchi and Spagat (1998) carry out a policy analysis that compares the mixes
of vocational and general education that occur in the model with the unique output-
maximizing mix and show that the vocational sector grows too large and the general
sector remains too small relative to the eﬃcient solution. This implies that developing
countries will tend to overinvest in vocational education at the expense of general.
17This view was challenged, among others, by Foster (1968), who stressed the role of
socio-political considerations for a growth-stimulating educational policy.
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Appendix. The UNESCO data set
UNESCO started to collect data on general and vocational education
in its Statistical Yearbook from the First Issue, which appeared in press in
1949. For a few countries data were available from the 1930s but it is only
starting in 1950 that information is consistently supplied for most countries.
The last available data are in the Thirty-ninth Issue of the Statistical Year-
book, which appeared in 1994 and contained data through 1991. Therefore
we were able to assemble data for a total of 149 countries for the 1950-1991
period.
We focused on data on education at the second level, defined as edu-
cation based upon at least 4 years of previous instruction at the first level
and providing general or specialized instruction, or both. Data on second-
level education cover general education, vocational education and teacher-
training, defined as follows: general education does not aim at preparing the
pupils directly for a given trade or occupation; vocational education aims at
preparing the pupils directly for a trade or occupation other than teaching;
teacher-training aims at preparing the pupils directly for teaching. We in-
cluded data on teacher-training into vocational education, because of their
similarities.
The beginning of the school year, as well as the school system as a whole
and the criteria used for classifying education by level and type vary from
country to country. Details for each country can be found in the Statistical
Yearbooks. Adult and special education are not covered. For most cases
data cover both public and private schools.
The UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks also supply data on per capita GDP
for the same time period.
We excluded from the resulting data set Eastern European countries and
the Soviet Union, which displayed a very high proportion of vocational over
general education due to the nature of the school reforms introduced by the
communist regimes, which for ideological reasons greatly emphasized the
role of vocational education. We also excluded oil countries, which abruptly
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Figure 1: Vocational over general enrollments in secondary education in
Italy, 1861-1990.
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Figure 2: Vocational over general enrollments in secondary education for
149 countries in 1950-1991.
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Figure 3: The time evolution of vocational over general enrollments.
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Figure 4: The time evolution of aggregate income.
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